

## COMPOSITE REPORT CATEGORY V

### From multiculturalism to interculturalism: political contexts of migration in Europe

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#### **Some Principled Aspects**

Ethnic minorities constitute a separate and rather special category. Such minorities are not a result of endogenous structural change except for the cases of directly imported labour during specific periods of labour shortage in the 1950s and 60s. Nor do they here refer to the settled historical ethnic minorities which are prevalent in central and particularly Eastern Europe.

Since the late 60s there has indeed been a massive movement into Western Europe of people from the Maghreb, Western and Southern Asia, the West Indies, the Southern half of Latin America, Western and Eastern Africa and Eastern Europe. One noted scholar speaks of a massive intrusion as a pattern theory of justice to rectify international economic injustice but with the inevitable consequences of suffering on both sides: 'It is a grim business to live on the margins of, and at the mercy of, a deeply alien and often contemptuous society; but...the immigrants...are not the only sufferers; the residential areas... and the communities in which they have to seek to find a new, if sometimes temporary, home, are all too often amongst the most neglected and rationally pessimistic components of a national population...who see it in effect as a further and more dramatic token of the neglect and indifference of their own rulers' (J. Dunn, 1996, p.155). The interpretation suggests that this is how the festering remnants of class society and cognitive chasms generate contemporary urban racism.

However, to widen the setting and understanding somewhat there is one dichotomy that calls for attention: on one hand closed neo-corporatist societies where the social state takes care of basic infrastructural needs such as housing, nursing, medicare and schooling but leaves no openings for transcending essentialist ethnic-cultural barriers through mechanisms such as the service sector market; and on the other hand those societies where the social state functions less well with resulting ghettoisation but at the same time presents an opportunity for active social mobility across ethnic and class lines due to the offerings of a service sector market (cf. M. Cross 1997).

There is tendency in this dichotomy that should be noted, even if such ideal ones seldom exist, and even in the case of explicit social state regimes reality is much more mixed with part ghettoisations, part black economy success stories, part remarkable examples of educational triumphs, part racial clashes but unfortunately with a pervasive segregationist tendency. The complication for the political landscape in the 1990s is to an extent a product of the fact that the 'historical compromise between local working-class communities and the capitalist city has been shaken up beyond any easy resettlement, as much by the feminisation of immigrant labour... as by the deconstruction of contemporary forms of masculinity and manual labour in the West; and this in a way which compromises national and class boundaries just as much as gendered and racialised ones' (P. Cohen 1997 and 1998). The recent ethnic conflicts on the Isle of Dogs in London are a good illustration of emerging complications where there is a desperate need for transcending multiculturalism in terms of

intercultural discourse (for other analogous examples see also the recent findings and reasonings by L. Back, 1997-8, P. Cohen 1998, R. Hewitt 1997).

Phil Cohen and Stuart Hall have in this context introduced a new category, the contemporary cultural trickster, who simultaneously plays on both sides of the race, gender or class fence. As an ideal type the trickster is operating in a political-cultural borderland within which new coalitions become prominent in strategic public sector domains. In a way the trickster then is the post-modern version of the cultural broker. Functioning in a clear-cut modern environment the cultural broker had an important political task (cf for instance M. Peterson 1996). The trickster is perhaps providing unwitting legitimacy to yet another, but this time a somewhat more sinister, category who is prone to capitalising on the new uncertainty principle by exploiting the relative luxury of the phenomenology of fragmentation and fluidity, while fetishising the borderlands as sites of cultural or political transgression for their own narcissistic purposes (P. Cohen 1998). However striking tendencies towards this interpretation of tricksters may appear, this new post-modern ideal type is seldom so clear-cut. Some interviewees in this category give the impression of being susceptible to becoming new tricksters, such as the character called 'the new syndrome' in the final section of this composite report on biographical thematic issues. However 'the new syndrome' migrant is driven by certain ideals even though unwittingly driven to assume the trickster model.

In pointing out the accelerating complexity of the 1990s setting in relation to ethnic minorities it may be appropriate for a reminder of the uncertainty in anticipating the future these processes induce. The biographical cases of our category on ethnic minorities do on the other hand convey a sense that a new syndrome of social behaviour and expectations on transnational experiences are about to assume a largely unanticipated shape, which the biographical method not only reveals but is able to depict the pattern of. This represents a breakthrough in social science methodology which will move the cognitive frontiers much closer to emergent social phenomena. In the concluding part of this composite report we will discuss pertinent illustrations from the biographical cases.

### **The Present Status Transition of Ethnic Minorities**

During the course of the 1980s a gap opened between explicit policies of restriction in immigration policies and a general expansion of immigration. The quota of unwanted immigration was the part that expanded not as a solicited policy but due to passive acceptance by states, either for humanitarian reasons or for the sheer lack of ability to keep migrants out. These tendencies, which have been persistent during the 1990s, have given rise to the question of why liberal states accept unwanted immigration? If one core prerogative of states is sovereignty over the admission and expulsion of aliens since sovereignty could not be seen as more absolute than in matters of emigration, naturalisation, nationality and expulsion (H. Ahrendt 1973), would the rise of 'unwanted immigration' then indicate a decline of sovereignty? Some scholars such as David Jacobson (1996) would be prepared to precipitate an affirmative answer. Jacobson on his part is keen to write off sovereignty since he finds it an anomaly. At the same time he disregards the historical variability and chronic imperfection of sovereignty.

If all immigration should be termed unwanted since restrictive laws were introduced, we are in for definitional problems, which in fact reflect the ambiguity in immigration policies and in views on multicultural society. Immigration was in principle unrestricted in Sweden up to the late 1960s even though hidden obstacles existed.

- In Italy no normative law on immigration existed until the 1970s. This meant that Italy's frontiers were in principle open even though a number of selective obstacles also existed which in reality made it hard to enter.

During the 1980s and 90s measures were taken to reinforce certain acts - such as the one on indemnity which caused one of the immigrant interviewees to call Italy a friendly nation - and regulations. In the sensitive context of ethnic minority rights (Hannah Arendt) it is often difficult to assess the validity of qualifications. In 1986 there was a first real turning point in legislation concerning immigration. It pronounced equality between foreign and national labour thereby giving local actors the responsibility to ensure full integration. However, the law was also a measure of control which enabled the authorities to repatriate the mass of non-integrated immigrants (see the Italian National Report).

- In Germany the reverse trend has applied for a considerable time. The Foreigner Law of 1965 had a negative ring to it. Before the permanence regulation of 1978 (*Aufenthaltsverfestigung*) the position of foreigners was unstable due to the official 'no-immigration' policy. In 1981 the law on reuniting families eventually brought if not a flood then a major influx of what were now new immigrants, albeit of the 'unwanted' sort, into Germany. In a manner typical of the federal status of Germany, the individual *Länder* applied the recommended policy of the federal government in very different ways and in accordance with the ruling political party. With reunification and the fall of Soviet rule a number of ethnic German groups from all over Eastern Europe started to return. This was aggravated by the taking over of the run down East Germany and its proneness to violent eruptions of neo-fascism. The Foreigner Law of 1990 dropped any hint of debarring immigration. Eventually the rights came to triumph over the controls imperative. However, the relative ideological instability of the 1990s prompted the Kohl government to resume restrictive policies towards immigrants.

- In the United Kingdom the controls imperative came to dominate over rights after the first laws of restriction directed against immigrants. But the landmark decision by the European Court of Human Rights in May 1985 found British legislation discriminatory on the ground of sex. This first backing down by the Thatcher government was followed by the 1988 Immigration Act which repealed the only family right that had existed in British immigration law while simultaneously turning the European court indictment into a means of even firmer immigration control (Cf. C. Joppke 1998, p.291).

Several interesting hypotheses have been presented as explanations for 'unwanted immigration'. One emphasises the universalistic liberal discourse, which forbids the public addressing of the ethnic or racial composition of migrants. A second says the benefits of immigration are concentrated and visible (inexpensive labour and reunited families) while its costs are diffused and intangible (G. Freeman 1995, C. Joppke 1998). A third concerns how the effects of globalism are eroding the sovereignty of nations; intended policies cannot be met on such a transnationally determined issue. A fourth point promoted by Saskia Sassen (1996) is a logical extension of the third one: state legitimacy has shifted from an exclusive emphasis on the sovereignty of the people of one nation to the rights of individuals regardless of nationality. Fifthly it can be argued that an emergent international human rights regime exerts a degree of protection over migrants (C. Joppke 1998), in particular in the light of events in former Yugoslavia, China (Tiananmen Square), Kurdish Iraq, Pinochet's Chile, etc. In this sense the American president Jimmy Carter was unwittingly decades early in raising this issue as a global one in the 1970s. Only in the 1990s has it come to maturity.

During the 1990s the conditions of immigrants changed radically in most European nations. It has become much more difficult to belong to an ethnic minority. Some developments such as a broader awareness of a multi-cultural reality may on the other hand be interpreted in a positive light. However in most of those nations where some degree of protection and control over immigrants existed to the extent that even model developments could be discerned, immigrant and ethnic minority policies have often deteriorated and even veered out of control.

One notable and violently tragic consequence of matters getting out of hand occurred one late October night in 1998 in Gothenburg, Sweden. 400 youngsters, the youngest 12 and the oldest 20, had gone to a celebratory disco in a venue belonging to the Macedonian union in Gothenburg. The organisers belonged to the Kurdish union. The DJ was a Somalian young man. Second generation immigrants from 19 different national backgrounds, including thirty or so Swedes, were gathered. Suddenly towards midnight the premises were consumed by fire. The venue was a death trap since it proved virtually impossible to escape through the backdoor emergency exit. The fire had started in the backdoor stairs. 63 young people succumbed immediately, practically all of them idealists and good students at Gothenburg gymnasiums, and most of them from the famous multicultural Hammarkullen district. More than a hundred were injured, some very seriously so.

When it happened it crossed many people's minds that it was a question of racist arson. The agitation among the immigrant communities was intermittently vehement. There was no doubt, according to one influential opinion, that neo-nazis, whose headquarters were quite close to the Macedonian union, had seized the opportunity to set immigrant youth ablaze. When it became clear that the police investigators, together with technical expertise, would carry out a meticulous search for clues to the point of stalling, opinions began to circulate that in the end no conclusion would be reached that might jeopardise civil peace and cause racial war in the suburbs. Such riots might even spread to the centre. At all costs the authorities wanted to put the lid on any cause that might exacerbate the disastrous relation between the substantial immigrant communities, whose anger against Swedish *apartheid* has been raging for some time, and Swedish society, which has remained virtually unaware of immigrant grievances. Immigrant commentators at the national level presented the metaphor of the segregated second-generation immigrant youth being driven into overcrowded chambers where they were trapped and easily overcome. All this was said to be condoned by Swedish society, which has callously ignored the drift towards *apartheid*.

Instead the authorities, in the form of the government and the municipal council, offered much public condolence and sympathy and invited future collaboration. After a few days of grief counselling on the part of immigrant associations they too came to the conclusion that for the sake of building bridges with the Swedish authorities and Swedes in general they had to take the outstretched hand and express support for those social institutions involved such as the police, fire brigade, hospitals, media, politicians, etc., even if it might compromise the truth and the fate of the victims. That would be a better way forward, rather than to exact vengeance or even justice. Civic order and peace for reconciliation, and a newfound platform for a more genuine coexistence may come at the cost of the truth. When it comes to security policies lies cease to be a moral problem and become a part of pre-emptive measures against disorder.

The grievances aired by the immigrant communities were not unfounded. The 1990s have turned out worse than anticipated mainly for the economic reasons given in the Swedish National Report. Since the Fall of the Wall, the security police have largely abandoned any

watch of Eastern foes in order to focus and concentrate on internal security instead. This is a common Western feature. Foreign and security policies have lost momentum and the real danger in the view of national authorities is represented by the more than unsettling conditions pertaining to severely dented civil societies and a hard to handle multiculturalism.

In the Swedish suburbs security police have organised an around the clock surveillance of representatives of immigrant communities, in particular second-generation youth. The motive is that the sheer heterogeneity provides fertile ground for shady operations often involving the Russian Mafia and transnational organised crime. This connection has no foundation but the very notion of insecurity and of not having the situation under control has induced internal security operations. However immigrant youth feel that they are the real object of the police interest. Since they are the visible ones and to an extent represent values which the police often regard as dysfunctional, general suspicion has reached such levels that a police car does not dare go alone into a suburb with a substantial immigrant population. An inflated scope for paranoia exists on both sides. At the same time ties of loyalty across religious and ethnic minority communities have grown among immigrants. In the wake of the tragedy in Gothenburg one remarkable manifestation took place for the first time in front of the general public. People from different Muslim orientations joined hands in a televised common Muslim service held in a public sports arena exactly one week after the disaster.

### **The Rise and Variations of Immigration Policies**

As tension has mounted in European societies there have been examples of myths and false data regarding immigrants circulating publicly. In Italy, for instance, it has been publicly 'leaked' that there are more than two million immigrants in the country, whereas there were only 900,000 at that time (1995) and 1.2 million in 1998. The definition of immigrant is then very wide and includes Americans. In the Mediterranean nations, which feel more exposed due to the proximity of North Africa and the Middle East, immigrant policies have succeeded in attracting selected guests. In Spanish, Italian and Greek public life, as well as in places heavily charged with information and symbols such as bookstores, traces of the vicinity of Africa are scant and at best 'quaint'. It is also evident in the case stories and profiles of Italy and Spain that there exists a certain attitude of feeling ensconced in these nations on the part of interviewees.

In major ex-colonial nations such as Britain, France, Portugal and the Netherlands there exists a vast and vibrant 'commonwealth' presence in the larger urban areas. There is a tendency on the part of these nations to think that they have done enough in terms of immigrant and refugee measures by simply maintaining an at times half-open door to their own ex-subjects. Indeed Britain absorbed the Asian Community of Uganda when president Amin expelled them. Many of them were already comparatively wealthy and they contributed to further wealth creation in the UK.

The situation is different for those refugees and immigrants who are destitute on arrival but equipped with some professional qualification from their home nations. Since neither exams nor professions from foreign nations count in a recipient nation with other traditions and a different language, their treatment is bound to be unjustified. Often new immigrants are seen with the same eyes as poor people were perceived when they arrived in the growing urban sectors of 19th century Europe.

Since all social classes, including the 'lower ones', were incorporated in the national systems by the time of the First World War and certainly by the time of the Second World

War, it was easier to maintain the idea on the part of nation-states that the development of a modern welfare state permitted the assimilation of immigrants, as long as they represented a carefully selected and minor group. The welfare state, in particular as it evolved after the Second World War, was built on homogenous national communities that on one hand presupposed a 'welfare vernacular' that could not be misunderstood by any group of society, and on the other hand could also afford shared common democratic values like pluralism and universalism without exposing them to any serious test.

The Swedish case may be illustrative. Immediately before the outbreak of the Second World War an agreement was made between the Social Democratic government in Sweden and the Social Democrats of the contested Sudeten-land whereby Sweden accepted a certain number of selected refugees with social democratic backgrounds. The experiment worked well. After the war a further batch of Sudeten Germans, who were now displaced persons to a degree, were recruited, not however as refugees this time but as imported labour. The companies with a demand for this sort of labour made the crude selection themselves. In all it concerned some 2,600 people who managed to adjust quite well. The example called for continued selective labour import. The procedure was repeated in the early 1950s when Swedish industrialists representing the more noted national champions handpicked labour on location in Italy and Yugoslavia. The communities which were duly established in Västerås, Ludvika and Gothenburg still remain, although under a different guise (see Swedish National Report).

This slow start with imported labour caused little if any friction. Any incidental controversy had an anecdotal character. At the time expectations about standards and quality of life were comparatively low among the Mediterranean workers, who had a much higher tempo than their Scandinavian brethren, to the extent that it caused resentment among union officials. In general Swedish and German unions came to acquire a reputation for organising the integration of immigrant labour more competently. Gone were also the days when Italian labour was used by *caporali* (in accordance with a system called '*caporalato*') to become strike-breakers.

In the Italian context the quest for *seclusion* (for strong borders against the state) among privately organised professionals, as among large sections of labour, appeared to be a first step towards the real political goal which was *pervasion* (across the borders of the state). This feature is rather special for the Latin and Catholic world in Europe where both class and Catholic organisations were pronounced anti-system political actors by the Republic. This was because although they were ostensibly defending themselves against the public sphere, they were invasively assaulting it.

In short, it was important for separate organisations, and in particular interest organisations, to influence public space and the policy profile of the nation-state. At the outset of their existence several of the radical and emancipatory movements - trade unions, co-operatives etc. - were markedly excluding membership admittance on ethnic grounds. However deplorable a socio-psychological phenomenon this was it said something about the importance at a particular stage in the nation-building process of clear-cut messages coming through for 100 per cent mobilisation of potential movement adherents. It is clear that the stronger the working class movement or trade union the more excluding it was during those stages of formation.

However the situation today is crying out for different approaches. In spite of present democracies having a biased, heterogeneous and suspicious character to their public space, the national self is still built more on ascriptive perceptions of belonging than on shared

values. But new immigrant communities must get a full share of prevailing idioms. Otherwise the political weakness of new immigrant communities, and not their strength, will detrimentally determine the fate of European democracies. The waves of immigration into Western Europe over the past 15 years have just highlighted and reinforced persisting democratic deficits.

Intolerance, apathy and radicalisation have been fairly persistent in the history of immigration within Europe, well rooted as they have always been in our 'unsimple past and democracywise unperfect present'. But right now the most acute and complex issue pertains to incompatibilities in cultural communications on different levels. There are many hopefuls who hold the view that understanding the impact of immigration could bring into the open the contradictory nature of our various regimes in Europe, which would then appear as what they are in the 1990s -democracies despite the people, in the words of Giovanna Zincone.

France is a good example of a former colonial power with a natural and large influx of 'French subjects' from Mahgreb, West Africa, South East Asia and the West Indies. After the first wave of mass immigration, which took place between the first *jus soli* act of 1851 and the sharpened up second one of 1889, it paid for people belonging to the French Commonwealth to settle in France. The French Communist Party (PCF) reacted from the start in a symptomatic manner to this immigration. The PCF blamed capitalism for creating colonialism, which drove colonised or ex-colonised people to France where they forced wages down for French workers, or else created a state of uneven competition on the labour market that also seriously impaired the standards and opportunities for the French working class.

In the French case it was during the key period of 1938-46 that the cleavage of society into camps of those who were positive to immigrants and those who were hostile emerged in full force. Ethnic selectivity, which was pursued by the responsible minister Georges Mauco in order to establish a structured immigration policy after Liberation in 1944, was effectively combated by the Ministers of the Interior (Tixier) and of Labour (Parodi) in the name of the values of the Liberation. During the past quarter century the same camps have re-emerged intact.

The alignment between legal principles and political practice was prolonged during the period of economic growth 1946-1974. It was after 1974 that the republican synthesis (a heritage from the 19<sup>th</sup> century political figures Ferry and Gambetta) was put to test. With the election to president of Giscard d'Estaing, a Gallic nobleman from Puy de Dôme, a degree of marked intolerance to immigrant groups was reinforced following Pompidou's relatively insensitive attitude towards the downtrodden in general, though not towards immigrants in particular. The latter half of the 1970s brought economic decline as a result of structural deficiencies in the economy. This negative development hit immigrants much harder than nationals. It is reminiscent of the effects on immigrant groups in other European nations in the 1990s but still very different from the experience of, for instance Sweden (see further down).

In France it was only in 1983 that immigrant politics took a more dramatic turn for the better. The election of Mitterand had already resulted in a number of improvements over the first 18 months. The presidential candidate of the Socialist Party had presented 110 proposals, of which several were contradictory, for elevating the situation of the immigrant populations to a more acceptable level. Events that followed coincided paradoxically with Mitterand's U-turn towards globally adjusted economic policies. An important movement for politicising the issue of the immigrant's right to vote ended up in its ceasing to be restricted to an

immigrant problem only in order to be recognised as a national one. The debate had in fact long been dormant due to the strict political neutrality upheld by even militant associations of political refugees, who restricted their political engagement to the political development in their former home nations.

In February 1983 an initiative was taken by the journal *Sans frontière* to mobilise immigrants for the municipal elections in March of that year. In July 1984 a much delayed law was enacted which concretised the recognition of a durability of immigrant staying rights. After a stay in France of more than three years a resident card was issued that lasted ten years and was immediately renewable. But in practice *l'état de grâce* for immigrants had been terminated at the end of 1982 when there was a harsh clamp down on those who did not have their papers in order.

In December 1985 the movement *Convergence 84* organised a march for civic rights, which in a powerful way contributed to promoting immigrants' political rights. Several new associations such as FASTI (*Fédération des associations de solidarité aux travailleurs immigrés*), MRAP (*Mouvement contre le racisme et pour l'amitié entre les peuples*) CAIF (*Conseil des associations immigrées en France*) and LDH (*Ligue des droits de l'homme*) emerged to work hard in large sensibilisation and information campaigns for the immigrant vote.

It was these movements rather than the political parties that fought for immigrant issues and rights. The French Communist Party was silent on the issue until June 1985 when it came out in front for immigrant rights because of its links to MRAP. The extreme right held Mitterand responsible for the supposed immigrant undermining of internal security, national values and national identity. Hence the Socialist Party kept a tactically low profile up to the Presidential election in 1988 in order not to cede important votes to the racist right. Mitterand's campaign was duly successful. This may have resulted in a limited boost to the immigrant cause. The law of October 1981 had repealed an earlier one ruling against immigration. But in actual fact the socialist ambiguity had already proved itself following Mitterand's speech in August 1983, which gave a harsh signal to put an end to clandestine immigration. Such immigrants had to be sent back immediately, in contrast to the already installed immigrants who made up a part of the national reality. During the Cohabitation years of 1986-8 the then Minister of Interior, the hard-line Corsican Charles Pasqua, reinforced discriminatory moods. When the Socialists came back in 1988 following Mitterand's successful reelection the new Prime Minister, Michel Rocard opted for a low profile policy towards immigrant communities. Then on 2nd of August 1989 the pernicious *loi Pasqua* was replaced by *la loi Joxe*, which redressed the texts of October 1981 and July 1984 reinstalling the card of residence.

At the end of 1989 the affaire '*foulard*' stole much of the attention on ethnic minority politics. It became a symbol for the non-integration of Islamic groups and sharpened struggle between the political right and *les banlieus*. A *Haut Conseil à l'intégration* began to work rapidly in 1991, successively submitting reports twice a year. These reports dealt with issues such as polygamy, Islam and clandestine work and were given much publicity in the media.

Towards the middle of the 1990s the polarisation of ethnic politics had assumed a new content and character. Several immigrant groups of varying denominations all of a sudden became politically militant. The mobilisation methods differed. In France the distinction between the *Harkis* and the *Beurs* had previously had a definite meaning. The *Harkis* constitute those Algerians who sided with the French against Algerian independence and later had to escape to France as a consequence. With the exception of the professional elite



among them most *Harkis* faced a life languishing in drab camps or squalid suburbs where they were alienated from both French life and other immigrants. They now represent a population of almost half a million people. The *Beurs* on the other hand are descendants of Maghrebian immigrants to France. They number slightly more than half a million. They constitute second generation immigrants which this nickname also indicates. *Beur* is actually the reverse *rebeu* which is itself the reverse of *arabe*. Hence the nickname *Beur* has become severely criticised as a silly expression of segregation. The critique of it notwithstanding it is in common household usage.

The opportunity for both categories to emancipate themselves would be to cling to the Muslim identity and to become a militant avant-garde. Convergence through a newly found confessional zest of class political implications emerges as a second-generation phenomenon. At the same time there is the general second-generation syndrome of maintaining a firm Muslim identity while simultaneously exhibiting attitudes and behaviours strikingly different from their parents. On the whole it is easy to agree with the observation concerning Western Europe that the pressure imposed on Muslim organisations by European official, legal, political and bureaucratic expectations has literally forced Islam to become an ethnic identity.

The French cases do not contradict in the least the background analyses of France - the rather haphazard and less than co-ordinated policy towards immigrants. The analogy with developments in many other Western European nations is striking. In spite of the long and often contradictory experience with integration politics - on one hand the French colonies and the assimilation processes, and on the other those who became French by virtue of the *jus soli* acts, which date back to 1851 and 1889 and were to legitimate socialisation - immigrants of several generations back are still considered foreigners in everyday practice; public policy instruments remain both blunt and crude. One example is the ephemerality with which immigrants have been treated in terms of institutions such as the *fonds d'action sociale* that was aimed at handing out bare subsistence means in order to encourage the immigrant to be a migrant and to return as quickly as possible.

A central debate exists in Europe which depicts an ideological line of division between those who are sympathetic to a local citizenship that would include all foreign residents on the one hand, and on the other those, in particular France, who advocate strong ties between nationality and citizenship. Reformers in their turn are thinking in terms of a process of equalisation of rights - first social, then civil, and ultimately political rights - while leaders of ethnic communities may negotiate collective votes in exchange for the creation of strong ethnic communities (P. Weil, 1997). The Treaty of Maastricht has on its part brought closures to most of these debates. In brief this means that most issues pertaining to immigrants remain unsolved.

The Swedish initiative to allow immigrants a voice in municipal elections was not without its curious problems and frictions (Swedish National Report). At exactly the same time, i.e. in 1975, the Dutch government actually came up with an analogous proposal. It was well received by the parties on the left including the Social Democratic PVDA. The Christian Democrats CDA and the Liberals VVD were however against it on the grounds that it excluded all those not domesticated to the concept of the European Community, which in reality meant by far the largest part of the immigrant collective. A two-thirds majority was required for a constitutional change.

There was general procrastination until the mid 1980s. Then on March 19 1986 and again in 1990 immigrants were allowed to vote in local elections. Symptomatically this did not change the political landscape since the immigrant vote was distributed among most

democratic parties albeit with a preponderance for leftist ones. The Centruumpartij, the right wing xenophobic party, was feared to deter ethnic minorities from using their voting rights. Instead it had the opposite effect and mobilised a much larger vote among immigrants than anticipated. This Dutch example should not be seen as a digression but as a complementary example of a positive variation.

The third ex-colonial power, the UK, saw a solid and constant influx of immigrants to the British Isles after 1882, particularly to the London area but also to seaports on the west coast. It was not an easy task for the unskilled immigrant workers to find jobs with the restrictive policies of the closed shop unions turned against them. Many dock worker's unions in London, Liverpool and Glasgow severely excluded foreign labour for reasons which appeared to be racist but in a narrower sense were a way to secure jobs and good salaries for British workers.

In 1905 the first alien act confirmed in law what already existed in reality. It simply formalised the distinction between British subject and alien more starkly than ever before (D. Cesarani 1997 p.68). Another alien act just before World War I aimed to halt the tide of refugees from Eastern Europe and economic migrants from the British empire. After World War II, and in particular after the loss of the colonies and empire, an influx of people from the commonwealth nations made their presence felt in a number of professions – e.g. heavy municipal work, hospital care and service jobs in retail - in metropolitan areas. It was a common opinion that the UK could never have managed economically without the significant input of nurses from Southern Africa and trade service people from Asia.

In 1948 a law was enacted giving people from the commonwealth nations the status of Citizens of the Commonwealth. One problem arose with the Irish withdrawal from the Commonwealth in the same year. A number of Irish nationals were living in Britain. Should a double citizenship be accorded to more nationals? Since the then Labour government needed the votes of the Irish immigrant workers, a law was adopted in 1949 regularising the political rights of Irish citizens. However, in 1973 a similar problem arose when Pakistan withdrew from the Commonwealth but as in the Irish case a pragmatic solution was applied also giving Pakistanis the same rights to vote.

In 1962 the then Tory government introduced the first measures to put the brakes on immigration. During the run up to the 1964 election, an outspokenly racist campaign was conducted by the Tory candidate Peter Griffiths in Smethwick against the explicitly antiracist Labour candidate Patrick Gordon-Walker. Griffiths won even though the Tories lost the general election. It indicated to the world of political hacks that racism paid. In 1970 much of the election campaign was coloured by Enoch Powell's anti-immigration speech somewhat earlier and the fact that Edward Heath, the Prime Minister to be, refused to silence Powell.

In 1981 people from the New Commonwealth (NCW) represented 4.2 per cent of the total population in Britain. This proportion has largely remained intact throughout the 1990s. A classification according to *jus soli* renders a denomination as foreigner to NCW-members born abroad. Two scholars at the Community Relations Commission, later the Commission for Racial Equality, Muhammed Anwar and David Kohler, published a report in 1975 that confirmed the decisive importance played by voters from the NCW in securing the victory of the Labour Party at the General Election in October 1974. Of the 17 marginal seats at stake 13 were won with the aid of ethnic minorities, according to the findings of Anwar and Kohler. The same pattern was then repeated at every election up to May 1 1997. The minority favouring the Tory Party was overwhelmingly to be found among Asians (14 per cent against 8 per cent of Caribbeans in 1974 and 23 per cent against 6 per cent in 1987), who also had a

substantially higher rate of vote registration (73 per cent) than for instance Caribbeans (63 per cent).

The old racism of the inter-war period, embodied in a last sigh by Enoch Powell and his 'rivers of blood' rhetoric, was after the 1970s eventually replaced by a new racism that was not biologically but culturally focussed. David Cesarani has pointed out that the New Racism relocated difference away from phenotype and genes to culture. 'By camouflaging hereditary qualities as a cultural inheritance, it became possible for mainstream politicians to inject racism back into debates about nationality and citizenship. The 'New Racism' has made citizenship itself the site of struggle over conceptions of the nation and national identity' (D. Cesarani 1997, p.69). In a similar vein Paul Gilroy has pointed to the persistent anniversaries and references to 'Britain's finest hour' more than half a century ago, which automatically excludes the bulk of post-1945 immigrants from mainstream national identity (despite significant New Commonwealth participation in the war) (P. Gilroy 1993).

The new discourse of racism focussed on cultural elements such as ethnicity, religion, language and customs in order to better exploit the law and the constitution as firm rocks of national identity. In this way the cultural issue relocated the arena of ethnic conflict away from the national periphery to the very national core of constitutional, legal, educational and religious realms. For instance the Educational Reform Act of 1988 called for schools to render that ol' time religion and a concentration on the teaching of British history to all pupils.

In 1987 four immigrant politicians were elected as Members of Parliament (MPs). Their consummate political skills and charismatic personalities ensured them reelection in 1992. In 1997 they were joined by several more. The role as an MP has a sufficiently universalist content to operate as a powerful factor for integration. An analogous tendency is evident within the previously often segregationist trade union movement. The election of Bill Morris in the early 1990s to the influential position of General Secretary of the Transport and General Worker's Union (TGWU) represented a very big step against discrimination in labour relations. Similarly after the landslide victory of New Labour, Paul Boateng was appointed as Secretary of Health. One other telling sign was the elevation to the House of Lords of a young successful businessman of a mixed Middle Eastern and Caribbean background who is also an effective spokesman for both gay and immigrant communities.

The Greek background is intriguing for very particular reasons. No other nation is so associated with the cradle of Europe and all modern institutions of democracy. Yet modern Greece is a comparatively young nation, which rests upon a history of fairly long periods of fragility. Modern Greece was built upon the Great Idea, which implied a reconstitution of ancient concepts of Greek nationhood encompassing several ethnic cultures. The historical promulgator of this idea, Rhigas Pheraios, was to an important degree inspired by the French Enlightenment ideas for which he was to be murdered some three decades before Greek independence in 1830.

There is a significance in Rhigas and the first prime minister of the new Greek nation both being Vlachs, an ethnic minority spread across the Balkans. Substantial parts of those groups who were to build modern Greece returned from favourite Greek locations of exile such as Paris, Munich and Odessa. The affinity with peoples and nations from around the shores of the Black Sea had an inescapable early impact upon the composition of the population of modern Greece. So, as the Greek National Report affirms, one policy existed for incorporated ethnic minorities and one for new, largely post-war and indeed mostly post-Cold War arrivals. The latter on one hand constitute immigrant communities now from the shores of the Eastern parts of the Mediterranean, most prominently Egypt and Lebanon

and Kurdistan, the vowed ally against the common enemy, Turkey, and on the other hand the ex-communist Balkans, Russians and the Ukrainians have become prominent among immigrants. A third category, about half a million people, the majority of whom are Albanians, consists of illegal, seasonal immigrant workers. As in the Swedish case there were additionally those, mostly East Europeans, who were en route to North America but got stuck in Greece. Finally, Greece, like the Latin nations of the Mediterranean, has become a new landing ground for East Asian domestic workers.

The conditions of Spain, which are well reflected in the Spanish National Report, offer several new developments. In the first place the federal constitution allows limited political self-rule to the *comunidad autónoma*, who are careful to follow a cautious system of rules implying a retention of centralised power to Madrid on new legislation pertaining to constitutional matters (Solozábal 1996). The *comunidad autónoma* are intent on a gradual expansion of their own powers with a mixed combination of means. These conditions do not prevent a differentiation between regions in Spain. Catalonia is an immigrant nation whereas the federal republic of Spain is an emigré one. As the National Report points out: for every immigrant there are three emigrés.

More than half of Catalonia's population is the result of internal migration during the 20th century with a concentration in the post-war years of industrial expansion. In the same wave workers expanded beyond Catalonia and the Spanish borders to the industrialised parts of central and northern Europe. As the National Report stresses, two thirds of immigrants to Spain come from the rest of Europe. The share from Third World countries has been growing since the 1970s in spite of restrictions. After the *Ley de Extranjera* in 1985 many migrants from Maghreb-nations were expelled. In 1991 an attempt was made to get to grips with the increasing rate of illegal immigration. However there are signs that Spain has become subject to the same phenomenon as other Western nations in terms of being a liberal state with 'unwanted' immigration.

Spain is not the prototypical target nation for refugees. Rather immigration has had economic and cultural grounds. Hence the composition of ethnic minorities in Spain is radically different from that of Northern Europe. Latin American refugees do obviously comprise a significant percentage but economic and social immigrants are as important. Spain may even have become a nation for self-realisation *par préférence* since cultural stereotypes have not yet become rigid.

The divided nation of Germany has continuously been so preoccupied by the *Heimatvertriebenen*, *die Mauer* and after 1989 *Ossis* and *Wessis* that the big issue of *Gastarbeitern* has often been lost. The status of 'guest-workers' from primarily southern and south-eastern Europe was from the start insecure and floating. The Federal Republic of Germany had become more of a *heimat* than any nation of origin to many of the second and even third generation 'gastarbeitern', who were not entitled to citizenship and still less to political participation or representation. In principle rights to apply for citizenship existed for *gastarbeitern* but the hurdles and constraints proved in practice to be very large.

With the oil price-generated recessions of 1973 and 1979 the status of *gastarbeitern* became even more exposed and subject to volatile whims. A poll in 1982 revealed that nearly two thirds of West Germans considered that there were too many foreigners and that they occupied too much space in the Bundesrepublik. 50 per cent thought that foreigners should be returned to their nations of origin. The persistent official view was that citizenship should be rooted in a homogenous ethnic and cultural community. The notion of a Peoples' Community (*Volksgemeinschaft*) had lingered on since the Third Reich without much reflection even

among ultra democrats. A more recent but possibly enduring shadow is emerging in the tensions between *Ossis* and *Wessis*.

However, even more importantly than the direct clash of identities between *Ossis* and *Wessis*, the cultures forming the East German and West German views of foreigners also differed in highly peculiar ways. In East Germany foreign workers, who according to official estimates in 1973 numbered 35,000 from around sixty different nations, lived in segregated conditions. By the end of 1989 the figure had probably trebled among whom there could be counted about 60,000 Vietnamese workers, 15,000 Mocambicans and 8,000 Cubans, who were living in separate hostels and only had contact with East Germans at work. As a result a large number of incidents of hostility between native and foreign workers occurred. Interestingly the official trade union confederation FDGB repeatedly noted that the many registered incidents were but the tip of the iceberg. In Karl-Marx-Stadt alone in one year in the 1970s more than a hundred clashes, mostly caused by East German chauvinism and nationalism, were reported by the local FDGB organisation (M. Fulbrook 1997).

In Western Germany the myth of the ethnic nation continued into the 1980s, in contrast to the nation based on popular assent as in France and the USA. Herder was very much alive in leading Christian Democrat Schäuble's rhetoric, which implied an identity linked to the cultural concept of *Volk* rather than a commitment to an idea. German basic law continued to cultivate an ethnic definition of citizenship, which made it hard for immigrants to acquire such a status. At the same time it turned out to be easy to enter Germany as a refugee seeking political asylum. It was the liberal state, having floods of unwanted immigration not only from the Third World but above all from the new Eastern Europe and the break-up of Yugoslavia, which contributed one million asylum seekers between 1989 and 1992, in addition to the repatriation of 1.2 million ethnic Germans.

In 1994 a new notion was introduced where the semantic twists appeared somewhat too transparent as '*Staatszugehörigkeit*' replaced the more common concept of '*Staatsangehörigkeit*' with the implication that a third generation immigrant whose parents were both born in Germany would be entitled to opt for German citizenship. A similar orientation has recently guided Swedish ethnic minority and immigration policies with the great difference that Sweden operates against a background of palpable tolerance.

Earlier Sweden had comparatively very liberal rules for acquiring citizenship. The standard procedure was that after seven years of living in Sweden an immigrant automatically acquired Swedish citizenship and could be allowed to keep dual citizenship. In special cases this procedure could even be hastened considerably. As another case of a liberal state with floods of 'unwanted immigrants' Sweden has with limited results introduced stiff rules to halt immigration after the major influx of refugees from Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo.

Sweden provides an excellent illustration of the complexities involved in inter-cultural communications, as can be seen in the Swedish national Report.

## **Biographic Thematic Issues**

There are two major aspects of ethnic minorities to focus upon. One concerns the prototypical experience of being a migrant and the response of the receiving society. The other alludes to what may be termed the more exceptional cases describing a new syndrome of migrant aspirations of fulfilling a mission or realising a self. The Italian report also discerns a division between passive and active migrants, which interestingly may be applied to both prototypes and exceptional cases.

In general this ethnic minorities/immigrants category constitutes five important sub-categories: refugees, economic migrants, cultural migrants, second generation immigrants and illegal migrants. In each National Report there is a certain preponderance towards one or the other: Sweden - five refugees and one cultural migrant; Britain - three second generation and two refugees; Italy - a mixture of economic and cultural migrants; France and Greece - two illegal, some refugees but mostly economic and cultural migrants; Spain - overwhelmingly cultural migrants with strong economic motives; Germany - one African cultural/economic educational migrant, three refugees, but also some common Soviet bloc cultural migrants (represented by people from Moscow and Budapest in the German report), whose identity fell apart when the wall fell and their ethnic origin, which earlier had been a non-issue, became a major obsession.

The first prototype contains two main categories: one is the refugee and the other the economic migrant. Refugees have normally sought access to specific nations, often as an en route station to more attractive destinations. The obvious targets are those nations where there already exists a cultural or even kin affinity. So for instance the Serbo-Croatian community that has been well entrenched and ensconced in Sweden as immigrant labour since the 1950s exerted an effective pull and legitimation factor on the huge waves of refugees from the break-up of Yugoslavia. Commonwealth refugees have equally easily found refuge in Britain and France.

The refugee can be expected to have a double exposure in his/her version of their told life since the future is of a more short term, direct concern. In general many reports have stressed the comparative richness of the migrant biography since it conveys lived lives in several cultural and social dimensions. Since the immediate future also is of decisive importance because of its sheer insecurity the uncertainty of this three-dimensional life story must be taken into account. There is a certain predictability to the futures of all the other categories once a trajectory is clear. For migrants the only certainty is a perpetual maladjustment.

The fate of the refugee - and this pertains to both first and second generations - is a nagging discontent because of a felt lack of recognition and a consequent constant reduction of self. There is a natural ambivalence - both longing and hesitation - to go back once things are in better order since there is the fear that *heimat* can never fulfil acquired aspirations, which are based on new cognitive experiences. And if a return turns out to fail, another return, however reluctantly, to the new adopted country will be twice as difficult and generate even more grievances.

A particular kind of refugee settled in Germany is those Russian Jews, about 90,000, who were persecuted by the anti-Semitic currents in Russia that were at their worst during the Bresjnev era. The case of the Kurd in Germany, who considers himself an individual migrant since he does not want to be identified with Kurdish interests per se, nor obviously with Kemalist Turkey, would still in the final analysis fall under the refugee label.

The biographical method lets the subjective dimension emerge, which reveals the complexity of the logic between the context of origin and the context of settlement (E. Tejero & L. Torradabella in the Spanish National Report). It is easy to discern the predominance of the informal context, which is determining for life strategies, in the countries of origin of many interviewees. In the countries of settlement their trajectories are determined by their becoming immersed in formal 'legal-rational' issues.

In the Swedish report five of the six interviewees are refugees. Sweden has been prominent in receiving political refugees for the past thirty years. This represents a rather

short span of time in immigration history. The substantial but limited economic immigration was characterised by recruited labour from Southern Europe in the 1950s. The refugee communities easily became the predominant ones from the 1970s onwards. This implies a fairly high degree of well-educated, politicised immigrant communities. Their risk is that they can never expect to be integrated into the receiving society to their full capacity. Their children, the second generation immigrants, experience the full potential of a worthy education, where they often excel, while the habitat and everyday life of the family remains segregated and reduced to what they perceive as a 'secondary citizenship'.

The French report contains cases of palpable risk. To emigrate is in itself risky and dangerous the report concludes. The migrant risks a lot in order to find a solution to a problem. If adequate resources are at hand the chance increases that a solution will be found but the migrant does not know beforehand if that will happen. There is a hinted typology of risk: love relations, escape from a problem, discrimination, the search for a solution, no public papers hence no identity, political refuge. There is a pervasive political element of risk in most of the French cases, mainly due to the colonial background, which involves a constant subjugation to open or hidden discrimination.

The Greek report also talks about discrimination as a general theme, in particular concerning the more constant ethnic minorities such as the Gypsies. But the actual risk involved concerns the attempt of the ethnic minority to be integrated and accepted by public Greek society. Such endeavours are often rebuffed and if at least semi-successful, which is often the case as with Anna, the migrant may find themselves dangling in an impossible in-between position as a hostage to either the Greek public or their own community.

In the case of Maria from Kenya she is using her migration to Greece to find herself in the way the young Africans in Italy would do. Maria has good intellectual ability which she is employing to analyse her own exposure to Greek discrimination and her need to have a major achievement behind her before she can approach her own home family. The Albanian Roland and the Russian Vladimir are on the other hand extreme cases of exposure to risk as illegal migrants in the Greek context, but existential reasons leave them no other option.

The risk facing the second generation is the pervasive conflictual perspective, which often leads to a deliberate yet involuntary double life as, for instance, in the British case of Djamillah. There also seems to be a tendency among the well-educated professional second generation, where the British cases of Asian origin and the German case of the Senegalese PhD in chemistry are telling illustrations, not to join the models of the established society which they may be entitled to but to focus on aiding the victims of society for whom they have a natural empathy or entering an insecure but more authentically expressive cultural career as an artist, musician, writer or actor.

The cultural migrants are basically the ones forming the 'new syndrome'. They are driven by other motives than the immediate needs of either escaping persecution or material shortages. These motives may be an idealistic craving to realise goals pertaining to either ideological or cultural ambitions. Juan Manuel in the Spanish report is a very articulate case of the 'new syndrome'. So is the one cultural migrant in the Swedish report. Both interestingly originate from Colombia. The case of the Polish woman in the Italian report and similar fates of Eastern European women also fall under sub-category cultural migrants even though the cultural part of their migration more often than not vanishes. In the Mediterranean context in particular Eastern Europeans tend to be more at risk than other immigrant groupings.

The African interviewees in Greece, Italy and Germany constitute a mixture of cultural and economic migrants. Having extended their radius of mobility from the over exploited urban regions of their home countries to European urban environments, contemporary young Africans are embracing several worlds. The motives are often rooted in their families but also consist of new visions of status enhancing and economic gain. However, a stingier Europe restricts openings for them making every lesson learnt very hard. The days of the 1950s and 60s when African students of the upper classes came to Europe for educational training for high office in their home nations seem very far off. In the world of the 1990s it seems to be more of a question of individual, perhaps family, satisfaction and global orientation. This puts these young Africans at immensely greater risk since they have to provide their own socialisation in several worlds while facing the fact that however high their qualifications they may neither be accepted nor fit in anywhere.

The illegal cases are often blatantly tragic examples of migrants from a society and culture in disarray – e.g. Russia and Algeria - whose chances to break a great looming risk are very low. It is all too close at hand to identify their risk with a reflection of their own societies since the surrounding world and in particular the countries of immigration have emphatically deterring views on for instance Russia and Algeria.

At the same time, there also exists a lingering awareness of the intellectual potential of these two mentioned nations in the West, which will probably help to open the sluices of mass emigration of highly qualified people from in particular Russia during the next few years. Russian intellectuals are more at risk in Russia today than they could ever be in the West as they themselves perceive it. This prospect adds to the anticipation that a world in financial flux will generate a great deal more emigration, mainly of a ‘cultural’ kind.

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